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Abstract
This paper aims at answering the question: How does a typically European bargaining
system |with collective bargaining, extension mechanisms and national minimum wage
|coexist with low unemployment rate and high wage °exibility? A unique data set on
workers, ¯rms and collective bargaining contracts in the Portuguese economy is used to
analyze the determinants of both the bargained wage and the wage drift. Results indicate
that wage drift stretches the returns to every worker and ¯rm attribute, whereas it shrinks
the returns to union bargaining power. Therefore, ¯rm-speci¯c arrangements, in the form of
wage drift, partly o®set collective bargaining, granting ¯rms a high degree of freedom when
setting wages. Union bargaining power raises the overall wage level, but lowers the returns
on worker attributes, an outcome of the egalitarian policy pursued.
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It has been extensively argued that labor market rigidities lead to unemployment.
The major line of reasoning states that, under wage rigidity, negative shocks in
the labor market will translate into adjustments of the employment level, thus
generating unemployment. European collective bargaining institutions therefore
have a poor reputation, since national minimum wages and minimum wages set
by collective bargaining for di®erent categories of workers can be sources of wage
rigidity.
However, ¯ner analyzes suggest that the impact of labor market institutions
on macroeconomic performance depends crucially on the degree of centralization
or coordination in the bargaining process. Nickell (1997) points out that a high
level of coordination among employers in the bargaining process may lead to lower
wage settlements and lower unemployment. Calmfors and Dri±ll (1988) highlight
that highly centralized or highly decentralized bargaining systems lead to lower
unemployment, whereas intermediate levels of centralization lead to the worst
outcome. Teulings and Hartog (1998) claim that more centralized wage setting
systems can be e±ciency-enhancing. For Portugal, Hartog, Pereira and Vieira
(2002) found that the level at which bargaining takes place has a signi¯cant impact
on the wage distribution and on the returns to worker and ¯rm attributes, and
evidence on The Netherlands points in the same direction (Hartog, Leuven and
Teulings, 2002). The impact of collective bargaining on the wage structure, wage
rigidity and labor market performance is therefore not clear-cut.
The case of Portugal can shed interesting light on this issue. The country is
pointed out as one of the OECD economies with highest wage °exibility (OECD,
1992), and it has one of the lowest unemployment rates in the European Union,
despite having typically European labor market institutions: collective bargaining
is widespread, setting the wages for unionized as well as non-unionized workers;
once a collective agreement is signed, extension mechanisms can widen its cov-
erage, voluntarily to employers or trade unions who had initially not signed the
1agreement, or by Government mandatory decision, irrespective of the workers'
union membership status; a national minimum wage is enforced.
The aim of this paper is to answer the questions: What degree of freedom do
employers have when manipulating wages in this regulated institutional setting?
How does a regulated institutional framework in the labor market coexist with low
unemployment rate and high wage °exibility? What is the impact of collective
bargaining on the wage distribution?
Two novel aspects are introduced in the analysis of this topic. First of all,
we rely on a micro data set that matches information on workers, ¯rms, as well
as collective bargaining contracts |over two million workers, 200 thousand ¯rms,
500 collective bargaining agreements and 30 thousand worker categories in collec-
tive bargaining. Secondly, we analyze the determinants of both the contractual
wage levels set by collective bargaining and the wage drift (di®erence between
actual wages and bargained wages). As such, the impact of worker attributes,
¯rm attributes and bargaining power on actual wages is decomposed into its im-
pact on bargained wages and on wage drift. The analysis therefore progresses to
the identi¯cation of the role of institutional forces versus market forces (¯rm-level
arrangements) on wages.
Section 2 summarizes the institutional framework for wage bargaining in Por-
tugal. Section 3 provides information on the data set and concepts used. Section
4 presents the results on the impact of the attributes of the worker, the ¯rm and
the bargaining process on contractual wages and on the wage drift. Section 5
discusses the question "What do results tell about a formal model of wage bar-
gaining?", scrutinizing the existence and the impact of trade unions egalitarian
pay policies. Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional framework for wage bargaining in Portugal:
what room for ¯rm manoeuvre?
Portugal shares with several other European countries characteristics of a regulated
industrial relations system, in contrast with the American model. Several aspects
2can be highlighted to support this claim.
² Degree of centralization in collective bargaining: Massive collective agree-
ments, often covering a whole industry, predominate in the economy, while
¯rm level collective bargaining covers a low proportion, less than 10 percent,
of the workforce. Also, centralized negotiations at the national level have
been taking place each year since 1984, between trade union confederations,
employers' federations and the Government. This level of bargaining sets in-
dicative guidelines for wage increase, which orient the collective bargaining
that follows.
² The role of extension mechanisms: Extension mechanisms are widespread in
the economy. Voluntary extensions are common, when one economic partner
|workers' or employers' representative |decides to subscribe to an agree-
ment which it had initially not signed. Compulsory extensions can be applied
by the Government, when the bargaining partners fail to reach an agreement,
when bargaining is obstructed in any way or workers are not covered by a
trade union. Therefore, the impact of collective bargaining goes far beyond
union membership and the distinction between unionized and non-unionized
workers or ¯rms becomes meaningless.
² Frequency of wage adjustments and synchronization of bargaining: The nego-
tiation of di®erent collective agreements is usually synchronized, taking e®ect
in January each year.
² Contents of the agreements: Since most collective agreements are industry-
wide, covering companies with very di®erent sizes and economic conditions,
their contents tend to be general, setting minimum working conditions, in
particular the base monthly wage for each category of workers, overtime pay
and the normal duration of work. Moreover, just a narrow set of topics
is updated annually, and therefore the contents of collective agreements is
often pointed out as being too immobile and containing little innovation (see
3Dornelas (1999) and Leit~ ao (1999)).1
Under these conditions, the links between the wage growth de¯ned by collective
agreements and the actual economic conditions prevailing at the micro (¯rm) level
can be very loose. Whatever the minimum wage level agreed upon for each category
of workers at the collective bargaining table, ¯rms are free to pay higher wages, and
they often deviate from that benchmark, adjusting it to ¯rm speci¯c conditions.
3 Data set and concepts used
3.1 Data set
This study is based on a longitudinal data set matching ¯rms and workers, which
covers the population of plants with wage-earners in manufacturing and the ser-
vices private sector in Portugal. The data are gathered every year by the Ministry
of Employment. Given the legally binding nature of the inquiry, the response rate is
extremely high. Reported data include the ¯rm's location, industry, employment,
sales, ownership, legal setting, and the worker's gender, age, skill, occupation,
schooling, date of admission into the company, earnings, duration of work, as well
as the mechanism of wage bargaining and the category in collective bargaining
(see the appendix for details on the data).
3.2 Computation of the contractual wage
In the Portuguese collective bargaining system, minimum contractual wages are
de¯ned for very speci¯c job classi¯cations. Given this fact, a majority of the
workforce in each category will actually earn the minimum contractual wage that
has been set by collective bargaining.
We have used this information to infer the contractual wage from the distri-
bution of actual base-wages for each worker category. In fact, the mode of the
distribution of the base wage corresponds with remarkable accuracy to the con-
tractual wage set by collective bargaining. To prove this claim, we have extensively
1Dornelas (1999) points out that they seldom deal with health, hygiene and security in the workplace, training
and its impact on career progression, and social protection beyond the minimum compulsory one.
4checked the relationship between contractual wages and the mode of the wage dis-
tribution for each worker category within each collective agreement, for a set of
industries chosen a-priori. Each of these industries covers a large proportion of the
working population, and they have contrasting wage levels:
² Textiles |cotton and knitted fabrics is a low-wage industry;
² Electric and electronic goods industry is a high-wage industry;
² Banking is a high-wage service industry.
Note that the number of workers in the selected industries (see table 1) represent
almost 10% of the full-time wage-earners in manufacturing and the services.
||||| Table 1 about here |||||
For this set of industries we have gathered the contractual wages for 1999 and
1998 for each worker category from the legal published documents (Boletim do
Trabalho e do Emprego), and compared them to the mode of the distribution of
the actual base wage. The results can be summarized as follows:
² The correlation between the contractual wages set by collective bargaining
and the mode of the base-wage is very high, ranging from 99 percent to 77
percent, respectively in the banking sector and the textiles industry in 1999
(see table 2). Visual inspection of the relationship between the contractual
wage and the mode of the base wage is presented in ¯gure 1. Each circle
represents one worker category and its area is proportional to the number of
workers covered. The accuracy of the modal base-wage as an indicator of the
bargained wage is striking.
² For a very high proportion of the working population, the contractual wage
set by collective bargaining is exactly equal to the mode of the distribution
of the base-wage. Such proportion ranges from 97 percent to 74 percent,
respectively in the banking sector in 1999 and the electric and electronic
equipment industry in 1998 (see ¯gure 2).
5Following these results, throughout this paper the mode of the base-wage for
each worker category within each collective agreement will be taken as the con-
tractual wage for that professional category.2 Just categories that cover at least
50 workers and agreements with at least one thousand workers will be kept in the
analysis. The sample sizes are described in table 3 in appendix.
||||{ Table 2 about here |||||
||||{ Figure 1 about here |||||
||||{ Figure 2 about here |||||
3.3 Computation of the wage drift
Wage drift was computed following the standard procedure in the literature (see
for example Hibbs and Locking (1996) or Ordine (1996)), as the log di®erence





where i stands for the worker, t for the time period, wactual is overall monthly
earnings, including the base-wage, tenure-related and other regularly paid compo-
nents; wbarg stands for the contractual wage de¯ned for the worker category by
collective bargaining.
2Since the wages set by collective bargaining are binding, one other possibility to infer the bargained wage
would be to consider the minimum base-wage observed in the data set for each worker category. However, workers
who worked less than the full month |for example, due to sickness or because their contract started later in the
month |may earn less than the bargained wage. In such a large sample of the working population, that method
would therefore be bound to capture the wrong value. Still another approach has been checked, which consisted
on identifying the bargained wage as the ¯rst peak in the distribution of the base-wage, i.e. the ¯rst point after
which the density function declined. However, this procedure is subject to the same drawbacks as the previous
one. Computing the bargained wage as the mode of the base-wage provided a more accurate value than any of
these two procedures.
64 Explaining the contractual wage and the actual wage at
the micro level
The average wage drift by industry3 in 1999 ranged from 0.20 in hotels and restau-
rants to 0.47 in the pulp, paper and printing industry (see table 4).
||||| Table 4 about here |||||
As expected, wage drift has a ed-equalizing impact on the wage distribution.
Indeed, it leads to higher wage dispersion than that of bargained wages. Also
according to expectations, the drift is particularly heterogenous at the top half of
the distribution, being more homogeneous for the lower bottom (see table 5).
||||| Table 5 about here |||||
Looking at the degree of association between bargained wages and the wage
drift, actual wages and their dispersion, at di®erent levels of aggregation, yields a
pattern worth mentioning (see table 6). Professional categories with higher bar-
gained wages tend to present lower dispersion of the wage drift (and therefore
lower dispersion of the actual wage, since all the wage variability within a cate-
gory results from wage drift). Similarly, at the level of the collective bargaining
agreement, higher average bargained wages are associated with lower dispersion of
both the wage drift and the actual wage.
||||| Table 6 about here |||||
Which are the determinants of the contractual wages agreed upon with trade
unions, and how do these di®er from the determinants of the actual wage that
is paid? Do collective bargaining outcomes re°ect the bargaining power of the
partners involved, whereas wage drift re°ects market conditions?
The regressions presented in table 7 explore the impact of worker attributes,
¯rm attributes and the collective bargaining system on bargained wages and on
3Two-digit classi¯cation.
7wage drift. On the worker and employer side, the usual determinants of wages
have been considered: the worker gender, schooling, age and tenure; the ¯rm size,
age, average gross labor productivity and gross job °ow4. Controls for the industry
and the region have been included in every regression.
The variables that characterize the institutional setting are less often found in
the empirical literature. The degree of coordination of employers in wage bar-
gaining and the degree of trade union power will deserve particular attention in
the interpretation of the results. The degree of coordination of employers results
simply from the de¯nition of the types of collective agreement existing in Por-
tugal: single-¯rm agreement; multi-¯rm agreement, signed by several employers,
though not organized into a formal association; sector agreement, signed between
employers' association(s) and trade union(s), often covering an economic sector.
Also, the Government can impose a mandatory regime, as described in section 2.
The degree of union bargaining power is captured by the concentration of bar-
gaining within an occupation, ¯rm or region. Those proxies are based on the idea
that, if the labor force is more united in the bargaining process, it will have a
stronger bargaining power. Recent experimental evidence in Berninghaus, Guth
and Keser (2003) indeed indicates that, when opting for collective bargaining in-
stead of decentralized bargaining, united players raise their claim for a share of
the pie (even though their payo® might not be larger, if the occurrence of con°icts
increases), and the opponent lowers its claims. The Her¯ndhal index was used to
evaluate the degree of concentration of bargaining within an occupation, ¯rm or
region.5 If one single collective agreement covers all the workforce in the occupa-
tion, the ¯rm or the region, the index reaches the value one, interpreted as a high
degree of union power within that occupation, ¯rm or region. On the contrary, a
fragmented bargaining process, with workers represented by several trade unions
bargaining separately, leads to a low value of the Her¯ndhal index and suggests
4Computed as gf =
¢Eft
1
2(Eft+Ef;t¡1), where E stands for employment level, f refers to the ¯rm and t is the
time period.
5It is computed as Hj =
P
i(shareij)2, where shareij is the share of workers covered by collective agreement
i, within unit j (de¯ned as an occupation at the 4-digit level, yielding 402 occupations, a ¯rm or a region, de¯ned
at a detailed level, yielding 18 regions in mainland Portugal).
8less union strength.
We have estimated tobit models on the wage bargained, the wage drift and, a
result of the two previous forces, the actual wages paid. This choice is justi¯ed by
the fact that contract wages cannot fall below the national minimum wage, and
actual wages cannot fall below the contract wage de¯ned for the worker category.
||||| Table 7 about here |||||
It is interesting to note, ¯rst of all, that wage drift reinforces the impact of
worker and ¯rm attributes on wages. Note that the signs of those coe±cients
are the same, in the bargained wage and the wage drift regressions. In other
words, wage drift stretches the distribution of the returns to education, gender,
age, tenure, ¯rm size, ¯rm productivity or ¯rm-level worker turnover (rate of job
creation or destruction). On the contrary, variables that capture the bargaining
power of trade unions have a high impact on bargained wages, but that impact
is partly o®set by wage drift. In fact, the concentration of bargaining within an
occupation or within a ¯rm become less relevant in the determination of actual
wages than they were in the determination of bargained wages. In other words,
wage drift shrinks the distribution of returns to union bargaining power.
The previous results lend support to the hypothesis that wage drift works as a
mechanism to overcome the constraints imposed by collective bargaining, allowing
¯rms wide scope for action in their wage policy.
The impact of the extent of union power deserves further comment. Higher
coordination on the side of the workers along occupation or ¯rm lines is associated
with higher wages. If the degree of concentration of bargaining within an occupa-
tion increases by 10 percentage points, the bargained wage increases by about 1%.
Similarly, a more united labor force bargaining within the ¯rm raises bargained
wages: an increase of 10 percentage points in the degree of concentration of bar-
gaining within a ¯rm raises bargained wages by approximately 2%. These results
suggest that the fragmentation of bargaining reduces union capacity to extract
rents.
9However, as mentioned before, these returns on union bargaining power are
o®set by ¯rm-speci¯c wage arrangements, in the form of wage drift. In the end,
the concentration of bargaining within the occupation or the ¯rm has a very low
impact on the actual wages paid.
The interpretation of the results on the geographical coverage of the agreements
is not as clear-cut. On one hand, agreements covering a wider area are associated
with lower bargained wages, possibly because unions are in that case unable to
fully exploit local labor market conditions. On the other hand, as opposed to the
results for the occupation and ¯rm, more fragmented wage bargaining within the
region lead to higher wage settlements, a result that is reinforced by wage drift.
On the employer side, higher coordination when bargaining over wages is asso-
ciated with lower wages. Indeed, single-¯rm or multi-¯rm agreements yield higher
bargained wages than sector-level agreements. Even though the rank of the type of
agreement changes after wage drift operates, it is still the case that single-¯rm and
multi-¯rm agreements yield higher wages than sector agreements. These results
lend support to the reasoning by Nickell (1997), according to which the coordina-
tion of employers leads to lower bargained wages, reducing the impact of collective
bargaining on unemployment.
The positive impact of the ¯rm's gross job creation rate and its average labor
productivity on the bargained wage is consistent with the results by Christo¯des
and Oswald (1992), who analyzed the impact of industry and regional variables
on wages bargained in a sample of labor contracts in Canada, and found evidence
that wage determination is a rent-sharing mechanism. Their work found that
higher pro¯ts in the industry enable unions to extract a higher rent in the form of
higher bargained wages, whereas a depressed labor market, with a higher regional
unemployment rate, decreases bargained wages.
105 What do results tell about a formal model of collective
bargaining?
The results so far presented are compatible with two di®erent situations in terms
of trade union action and formal models of bargaining. On one hand, it could be
the case that trade unions have in Portugal a low bargaining power, being unable
to extract a high return on worker attributes. Willingness of companies to pay
a higher wage premium would thus be revealed only after the stage of collective
bargaining, in the form of wage drift operating at the ¯rm level. On the other
hand, it could be the case that unions, though having a high bargaining power,
have strong equalizing aims, explicitly trying to compress the returns to worker
attributes. As such, they would use their bargaining power to set a higher overall
wage level, but a lower return on worker attributes.
Several empirical studies using cross-section worker data have indeed shown
that trade unions reduce wage dispersion, in particular because the returns to
worker attributes are lower in the unionized sector (Freeman, 1980) (Fairris, 2003)
(Meng, 1990), just like the returns to ¯rm attributes (Dell'Aringa and Lucifora,
1994). However, the impact of union action on wages could partly result from
selectivity, if the worker unobservable quality is correlated with the unionization
status, a problem that can only be tackled using longitudinal data. Longitudinal
studies may, however, underestimate the impact of trade unions on wages, if there
is measurement error in the variable union status (Freeman, 1984). Explicitly
accounting for selectivity and measurement error in union status, Card (1996)
showed that unions compress the wage distribution by raising more the wages
of low-skilled workers. Part of this result is driven by a selection mechanism:
union members with low observable skills have higher unobservable quality than
non-union-members; conversely, union members with high observable skills have
lower unobservable quality than non-union-members. Lemieux (1998) allowed the
returns to worker observable attributes and unobservable quality to di®er in the
unionized and non-unionized sectors. Interestingly, he ¯nds that unions raise the
11average wage level, but compress the returns to both observable and unobservable
worker quality. The ¯nding by the empirical literature that unions reduce wage
dispersion, in particular by lowering the returns on human capital, therefore seems
robust.
Theoretical models explicitly handling the role of wage dispersion in union
preferences are, however, scarcer. The models by Farber (1978) and Booth (1984)
handle trade unions egalitarian aims by considering that they are political units,
whose policies will determine workers support for the union leaders or their mem-
bership decision. As such, union leaders will choose to bargain for the wage that
maximizes the utility of the median voter. If the median wage is below the mean
wage, as it is commonly the case, a majority of workers will favor a policy that
compresses the wage distribution. According to Agell and Lommerud (1992), there
is an insurance rationale for wage compression. If risk-averse workers face uncer-
tainty about their future position in the wage distribution, and the market fails to
provide insurance against wage risks, then workers will support wage compression.
Rodr¶ ³guez-Guti¶ errez (2001) directly introduces the degree of wage dispersion into
the union utility function, based on the assumption that unions obtain utility from
wage compression.
The two hypothesis put forth to explain the results on Portugal |the exis-
tence of a low union bargaining power or an explicit aim by unions to reduce
the returns on worker attributes |, can be disentangled, within the framework
of the current paper, by running the previous regression of bargained wages with
interaction terms between every worker attribute and a measure of union power
(the concentration of bargaining within occupations) among the regressors. The
coe±cients on those interaction terms would enable an answer to the question: Do
trade unions use their bargaining power to lower the returns on worker attributes,
while nevertheless raising the overall wage level?
||||| Table 8 about here |||||
Result in table 8 provide support for the egalitarian pay policy hypothesis.
12They show that trade unions use their power to raise the overall wage level (see
the coe±cients on the concentration of bargaining within the occupation or ¯rm),
and to reduce the wage penalty imposed on women and newcomers into the ¯rm
(see the positive coe±cients on the interactions of each of these variables with the
index of trade union power). On the contrary, a higher union bargaining power
is associated with lower returns on schooling, age and tenure. The low returns to
worker attributes set by collective bargaining do not result from a lack of union
power, but instead result from an explicit aim of compressing the wage distribution,
while raising the overall wage level.
6 Conclusion
Most often, micro level analysis of the returns to worker and ¯rm attributes have
considered only the actual wage of the worker. This study has progressed along
two directions. First of all, we have decomposed the worker's actual wage into
the wage set by collective bargaining and ¯rm-speci¯c wage arrangements, in the
form of wage drift. Secondly, we have analyzed the impact of, not just worker and
¯rm attributes, but also characteristics of the wage setting process, on wages. In
particular, we focused on the impact of union bargaining power and the degree of
employer coordination on the wage distribution.
We found that the distribution of wages set by collective agreements re°ects
to a high extent the bargaining power of the partners negotiating, and as such
higher coordination among employers tends to be associated with lower wages,
whereas a more united labor force bargaining within an occupation or ¯rm raises
the overall wage level, while reducing the returns to worker attributes, an indication
of the strong equalizing aims pursued by trade unions. However, wage drift work
as a mechanism to overcome the constraints imposed by collective bargaining,
allowing ¯rms wide scope for action in their wage setting policy. Indeed, wage
drift reinforces the impact of worker and ¯rm attributes on wages, while, on the
contrary, it dilutes the impact of collective bargaining. Wage drift stretches the
distribution of the returns to education, gender, age, tenure, ¯rm size, ¯rm age
13and ¯rm productivity whereas, on the contrary, it shrinks the returns to union
bargaining power. This operation of institutional forces and market forces in
the Portuguese economy may help explain why a typically European institutional
framework is compatible with high wage °exibility and low unemployment.
Appendix: Data set
Quadros de Pessoal gathers information on workers, ¯rms and collective bargain-
ing contracts in the Portuguese private sector. In this study, only wage-earners re-
ported as full-timers and working at least 25 hours a week, aged 16 to 65, earning at
least the national minimum wage, in manufacturing and the services in mainland
Portugal, were considered for analysis. The national minimum wage constraint
may drop workers in particular categories, such as apprentices and youngsters
below the age of 18.
Only collective agreements e®ective before October (the date the data were
gathered) were retained for analysis. Given that we are computing the bargained
wage as the mode of the distribution of base-wages for each category of workers,
the categories considered in the analysis should cover a certain number of workers.
Categories with at least 50 workers and agreements with at least one thousand
workers were kept for analysis.
||||| Table 3 about here |||||
||||| Table 9 about here |||||
The data base reports the gross monthly wage, split into the following com-
ponents: base wage, seniority-indexed components of pay, other regularly paid
components, overtime work and irregularly paid components. Normal and over-
time hours of work are as well reported. Minimum contractual wages are de¯ned
in Portugal as a monthly wage rate.
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Electric and electronic equipment 0.885 0.949
Textiles: cotton and knitted fabrics 0.834 0.768
Table 2: Correlation between contractual wages and the mode of the base-wage
for the worker professional categories.
Note: Weight equal to size of professional category. Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTSS
(1998-1999) and Boletim do Trabalho e Emprego (several numbers).
Sample size workers ¯rms agreements categories
Total employer-employee data set 2,568,456 242,026 531 30,659
Ftimers, 16-65 yrs, manuf & serv., w>=min 1,644,550 172,372 385 24,114
Col. barg. categories>=50 workers 1,462,932 165,795 232 3,871
Col. barg. agreements>=1000 workers 1,438,699 162,604 133 3,662
Table 3: Sample sizes in the analysis of wage bargained and wage drift, 1999.
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1999).
18Industry Av. wage drift
food, bev,tobacco .300
textiles, wearing app, leather .233
wood .265
pulp, paper, printing .465
petroleum prod, chemicals, rubber, plastic .435
other non-metallic mineral prod .327
basic metals, fabricated metal products .326
machinery, equipment .338
other manufacturing .241




transportation, storage, communication .352
¯nancial intermediation .456
real estate, business activities .402
Table 4: Average wage drift by industry, 1999.
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1999).
Gini Q90=Q10 Q50=Q10 Q90=Q50
Bargained wage 0.228 2.45 1.25 1.96
Wage drift 0.199 2.06 1.27 1.62
Actual wage 0.319 3.64 1.47 2.48
Table 5: Dispersion of bargained wages, wage drift and actual wages, 1999.
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1999).
Professional category Collective agreement
barg. wage av. barg wage
av. actual wage .901 .949
av. wage drift .003 .134
dispersion actual wage -.169 -.008
dispersion wage drift -.169 -.385
Table 6: Correlation between bargained wages and: actual wage, wage drift and
their dispersion, at different levels of aggregation, 1999.
Notes: Correlations are weighted by the size of each group. The dispersion indicator is the coe±cient of
variation. Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1999).
19wage bargained wage drift wage actual
(coef.) (marg.) (coef.) (marg.) (coef.) (marg.)
gender -.109 -.062 -.128 -.079 -.204 -.177
(.0007) (.0007) (.0007)
schooling .027 .016 .030 .019 .053 .047
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
age .034 .020 .018 .011 .038 .034
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
age squared -.0003 -.0002 -.0002 -.0001 -.0004 -.0003
(2.41e-06) (2.34e-06) (2.43e-06)
tenure .007 .004 .002 .001 .007 .006
(.00005) (.00005) (.00005)
tenure less than 1 year -.033 -.019 -.038 -.024 -.058 -.051
(.0009) (.0009) (.0009)
¯rm size (log) .048 .028 .012 .008 .041 .036
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
¯rm age -.0004 -.0003 -.0002 -.0001 -.0005 -.0005
(1.00e-05) (1.00e-05) (.00002)
¯rm av. labor productivity (log) .044 .026 .033 .021 .064 .057
(.0003) (.0003) (.0003)
¯rm gross job °ow rate .002 .001 .012 .007 .016 .014
(.0006) (.0006) (.0007)
ag. multi-¯rm .093 .058 -.025 -.016 -.017 -.015
(.004) (.004) (.004)
ag. sectoral -.036 -.022 -.024 -.016 -.145 -.132
(.003) (.003) (.003)
ag. mandatory regime -.150 -.078 .179 .127 -.023 -.020
(.004) (.004) (.004)
conc. ag. within occup. (Her¯nd.) .112 .065 -.092 -.058 -.025 -.022
(.001) (.001) (.001)
conc. ag. within ¯rm (Her¯nd.) .263 .153 -.214 -.135 -.013 -.011
(.003) (.003) (.003)
conc. ag. within region (Her¯nd.) -.032 -.019 -.063 -.040 -.183 -.161
(.011) (.011) (.011)
geog. scope agr. (number regions) -.005 -.003 .010 .006 .002 .002
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
size col. agreement (log) -.035 -.021 .008 .005 -.008 -.007
(.0004) (.0004) (.0005)
Obs. 1134427 1134427 1134427
Log likelihood -403240.9 -362584.8 -372350.1
R2 0.54 0.30 0.59
^ ¾ .301 .312 .327
Table 7: Tobit model, bargained wage and wage drift, 1999.
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1999). Note: Three regional dummy variables and 15
industry dummy variables have been included in each regression. Standard-errors in parenthesis.
20Variable (coef.) (std. err.) (marg.)
gender -0.113 (0.001) -.065
schooling 0.032 (0.0001) .018
age 0.044 (0.0002) .026
age squared 0.0004 (0.000) -.0003
tenure 0.010 (0.000) .006
tenure less than 1 year -0.036 (0.001) -.021
gender*union power 0.016 (0.002) .009
schooling*union power -0.015 (0.0003) -.009
age*union power -0.027 (0.001) -.016
age squared*union power 0.0004 (0.000) .0002
tenure*union power -0.009 (0.0001) -.005
tenure less than 1 year*union power 0.026 (0.003) .015
¯rm size (log) 0.049 (0.0002) .028
¯rm age -0.001 (0.000) -.0003
¯rm av. labor productivity (log) 0.043 (0.0003) .025
¯rm gross job °ow rate 0.0002 (0.001) -.0001
ag. multi-¯rm 0.109 (0.004) .069
ag. sectoral -0.037 (0.003) -.022
ag. mandatory regime -0.144 (0.004) -.075
concent. ag. within occupation (Her¯ndhal) 0.839 (0.011) .489
concent. ag. within ¯rm (Her¯ndhal) 0.257 (0.003) .150
concent. ag. within region (Her¯ndhal) -0.011 (0.011) -.006
geog. scope agreement (number regions) -0.005 (0.0001) -.003





Table 8: Tobit model, bargained wage: worker attributes interacted with degree
of union power, 1999.
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1999). Note: Three regional dummy variables and 15
industry dummy variables have been included in each regression.
21variable mean std. dev.
bargained wage (log) 11.35 0.38





tenure less than 1 year 0.17
¯rm size (log) 4.53 2.37
¯rm age 21.63 23.5
¯rm av. labor productivity (log) 9.17 1.24
¯rm gross job °ow rate 0.15 0.5
ag. multi-¯rm 0.05
ag. sectoral 0.86
ag. mandatory regime 0.04
concent. ag. within ind. (Her¯ndhal) 0.69 0.3
concent. ag. within ¯rm (Her¯ndhal) 0.97 0.1
concent. ag. within region (Her¯ndhal) 0.07 0.04
geog. scope agreement (number regions) 14.51 5.25
size col. agreement (log) 10.38 1.24
N 1134427
Table 9: Descriptive statistics, regression data, 1999.









































































































































































Figure 1: contractual wage versus mode of the base-wage by worker professional
category.
Note: Each circle represents one worker professional category and its area is proportional to the number of
workers covered. Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1998-1999) and Boletim do Trabalho















































































Figure 2: Share of workers whose contractual wage is accurately inferred using
the mode of the distribution of base-wages for the professional category.
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